subject: cyberanarchy hall of fame: Nazi counterespionage in Holland 1942-1943


This gives you some idea of what I have been trying to accomplish
with BlackNet in the areas of sabotage, espionage, and guerilla
warfare in Cyberspace. I'm especially impressed with how the Nazis
were able to manpulate and track many "tentacles" simultaneously,
although our Cypherpunk software coordinating our own international
network over the Internet far surpasses their capabilities in 
elegance and sophistication. Another neat thing is how they 
tricked the media into running propaganda and disinformation to
advance their secret "black" agenda. These guys were real 
profesionals. I really admire 'em. their way cool! But that
Shreiderer guy gives me the creeps, in a kind of exciting way ... 
I bet he was the main torture dude for them ...

I read about all this first when I was working at Intel from 1974 
to 1986 and have been striving to surpass these techniques with 
Eric Hughes for years now that I don't have to work and have a lot 
of money to blow. Our efforts are just beginning to bear fruit on
the Internet. We have sites and addresses all over the world now. 
And it beats stock investing by a long shot!!

You can read about us and our "cyberspatial guerilla group", the 
Cypherpunks, in Wired and New York Times (I forget the reference, 
maybe someone else can post) but we don't mention the black 
marketeering, tax evasion, espionage, money laundering, overthrow 
of goverments etc. in any of our press interviews. People tend to 
get too frightened by all that stuff, and call us liberterian 
extremists for it. So we leave it out, and say that we're a bunch 
of folks who are just interested in Privacy. The `Cryptographic
Revolution' and all that jazz. (Makes you wonder if we have tricked 
some reporters, wink wink ;-)  But we are still working feverishly 
on the underground, tax-free, anything-goes Cypherpunk Digital Bank 
in both Texas and California with many other neat projects up our 
sleeves! We expect a lot of interest soon from all the drug dealers 
out there!!!

I will be giveing some more public lectures in California soon. 
Email me or cypherpunks@toad.com to find out more information. 
You can ask questions as long as you don't call us fanatics, 
radicles, or criminals! <grin> Hope to see ya there!

We have some public information on soda.berkeley.edu:
/pub/cypherpunks/rants. But this is more of the bland stuff so we
don't get busted. The really hot stuff is in crvax.sri.com directory
`/RISKS:', files RISKS-15.25, RISKS-15.27, and RISKS-15.28x


Anyway, Enjoy!!


.........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.


===

Introduction to _London Calling North Pole_ 
by A. Dulles
_Great True Spy Stories_ p.364


`North Pole' was without question one of the most effective German
counterespionage operations of all time-- not so much because of the
level at which it operated, which was not of the highest, but because of
its complexity, extent, duration, and the cleverness with which it was
executed. It would have been unthinkable before the days of radio.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE), during World War II,
directed intelligence and sabotage operations against Nazi-occupied
Europe from London via radio links to underground groups. It frequently
air-dropped into enemy territory agents, equipment and munitions, as
well as the radio operators themselves who were to work with underground
groups. German Military Intelligence, the so-called Abwehr, was able in
Holland to capture and `turn' some of the British SOE agents who had
secretly been dropped into Holland. By controlling and dictating the
messages of these agents in their underground transmissions to London,
the Abwehr enticed the SOE to keep dropping further agents and material,
immediately apprehended on arrival. Over a period of time (1942-44) a
large part of SOE's efforts to support the Dutch Underground was thus
neutralized. This operation was called `North Pole' by the Germans. It
was directed by H.J. Giskes, an Abwehr officer, from whose book on the
subject the following excerpt is taken (_London Calling North Pole_).
`Ebenezer' was the name the Germans gave to the captured Dutch radio
operator whom they had forced to cooperate with them at the time my
account begins. MID is the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, working
out of London with the British SOE. Funk-Abwehr is the German name for
counterespionage units engaged in the technical task of locating secret
radio transmitters by direction-finding (D/F) methods. And SIP and ORPO
are German police units working in conjunction with the Abwehr.


===

_London Calling North Pole_
by H.J. Giskes

Our expectation that Ebenezer would soon be sent new tasks by London was
subjected to a difficult test. We had not yet had much experience at
this sort of thing and the quiet interval seemed all the more ominous by
reason of the fact that we had incontestable proof that the London
Secret Service was carrying out operations in Holland without making use
of our `good offices'.

The first of these occasions was in early April. I received a report
from the _gendarmerie_ that the body of a parachutist had been found,
the man having fractured his skull on landing against a stone water
trough. Investigation showed that the dead man belonged to a group of
agents who had dropped in the vicinity of Holten. In our efforts to
clear up this mysterious affair we turned for help to the local
Luftwaffe headquarters which gave out daily reports in map form
containing details of all enemy air activity during the previous twenty-
four hours.  The information on which these maps were based was provided
by air-observation posts and radar stations, which plotted the course,
height, circling positions, etc. of all single aircraft flying across
Holland. We were agreeably surprised by the completeness and accuracy of
this information. We found, for example, that details of the operations
over Hooghalen and Steenwijk on 28th February and 27th March had been
fairly accurately recorded. And we were now able to confirm that the
dead agent and his companions must have been dropped near Holten on 28th
March. Through the Luftwaffe headquarters in Amsterdam we arranged for
closer watch to be kept so as to establish the course of single
aircraft, which we described by the word `specialists', as accurately as
possible. The evaluation of these daily reports, whose accuracy steadily
increased, gave us a useful line on the operations which the Allied
Secret Service in England had started without our knowledge. Another
indication of secret enemy activity came from Funk-Abwehr and the FuB
headquarters, to the effect that a new transmitter had been heard in the
Utrecht area, whose radio link had been fixed by D/F as lying close to
London. Intercepted traffic indicated that this was the same station as
that with which Ebenezer worked. And to add to it all Heinrichs came to
me in the second half of April with the news that Radio Orange was once
more passing `positive' and `negative' signals.

From all this we concluded that at least one group of agents was working
in Holland outside our control and that preparations for other drops had
been made. All this made me very uneasy about our play-back on
Ebenezer. Had London smelt a rat?

On 29th April Ebenezer received instructions to collect material which
would be dropped in the previous area near Steenwijk. I was pretty sure
that it would mean bombs this time instead of containers, so I took full
precautions. I borrowed against the day of the drop, which was 25th
April, three motorized 3.7-cm. flak guns from Huptmann Lent, the
celebrated night flyer and Commandant of the airfield at Leeuwarden,
which on the day of the operation were sited round the dropping area
after dark. I had the red lights of the triangle fixed on posts so as
not to endanger personnel, and arranged things so that they could be
switched on from a point 300 yards distant under cover. The same was
done for the white light. The flak battery had orders to open fire in
the event of bombs being dropped, or if I should fired a red rocket.

We switched on the lights as the British aircraft made its approach at
about 0100. `Tommy' flew several times across the area, but clearly
missed his direction, as the lights were not being pointed at the
aircraft. As he crossed the third time I went to the apex of the
triangle and shone my white light at him until he turned on his correct
course. I have to thank the absence of bombs for my ability to go on
telling this story.

This drop was definite proof that London had not yet discovered our
control of Ebenezer. I forgot, in my delight, the lamentations of the
young officer in charge of the flak, who had not been able to fire, and
who might never again have such a prize held in his sights at a range of
two yards.

The development of `Nordpol' reached a decisive stage at the beginning
of May. All that we had achieved hitherto could only have been
maintained for a short while had not luck, sheer chance, and ingenuity
caused to fall into our hands all the lines by which the London Secret
Service controlled MID-SOE in Holland at that time.

At the end of April London found itself compelled to join up with one
another three independent groups of agents and one other isolated
individual. Since Ebenezer was included in this link-up, we very soon
succeeded in identifying the whole organization.

It happened in this way. In the period February-April, 1942, MID-SOE had
dropped three groups of agent in Holland, each consisting of two men and
a radio set. We knew nothing of these operations. Another single agent
had been landed on the Dutch coast by MTB. The operations consisted of
the following:

Operation Lettuce. Two agents, named Jordaan and Ras, dropped near
Holten on 28th February 1942. Jordaan was radio operator and was to work
in accordance with Plan Trumpet.

Operation Turnip. On 28th February 1942 Agent Andringa and his operator
Maartens were dropped near Holten. The set was to be operated in
accordance with Plan Turnip. Maartens had an accident and it was his
body that was found near the water trough.

Operation Leek. Agent Kloos with his operator Sebes dropped on 5th April
1942. The set was to have been operated in accordance with Plan Heck,
but it was rendered useless by damage during the drop.

Operation Potato. On the 19th April 1942, Agent de Haas, using the
cover-name `Pijl,' landed by MTB on the Dutch coast. Pijl had no radio
transmitter, but was equipped with a radio-telephony set capable of
working at ranges up to five kilometres. He had been sent out from
London to contact Group Ebenezer.

Since the Turnip and Heck sets could neither of them establish
communication with England, these agents made contact with Group
Lettuce, which was operating the Trumpet set, in order to report their
mishaps to London. It was not clear whether or not London had told
Lettuce to establish these contacts. A signal from Trumpet, intercepted
on 24th April and subsequently deciphered, indicated that Trumped had
been in contact with Agent de Haas from Operation Potato, but that the
latter had been unable to get in touch with Ebenezer. London thereupon
ordered Ebenezer to make contact with Trumpet by a signal passed to the
radio set under our control, and the circle was complete.

A loose contact between different groups of agents had the disadvantage
from our point of view that imminent arrests could be quickly reported
to London, thus making it difficult to play-back a captured transmitter.
But if this contact became a close one, as in the present instance where
Trumpet was operating for three other groups, the danger for all of them
became very great should one be discovered and liquidated by the German
counterespionage. It was highly unfortunate for London that our
controlled station Ebenezer had been ordered to make these contacts just
at the moment when the groups which were still working at liberty had
been linked up directly with one another. (I do not know all the details
of how Schreieder and his section in a few days achieved the liquidation
of the entire enemy MID-SOE network operating in Holland at that time.)

Without doubt lack of experience and gullibility played an important
part on the other side. The agents were really amateurs, despite their
training in England, and they had no opportunity to work up through
practice to the standard required for their immensely difficult task.
Generally speaking they could not have reached the standard of a
specialist such as Schreieder.

Trumpet had fallen into our hands complete with signal plan, operating
and cipher material. The operator Jordaan collapsed when he discovered
the extent of the disaster. He was a well-educated young man of good
family, perhaps not developed or tough enough for the most dangerous of
the jobs known to secret service-- agent operating. But that wasn't his
fault! Jordaan soon developed confidence in Huntemann and myself, and
took the chance which we offered him of operating his transmitter, after
we had succeeded in getting him through the nervous crisis which
followed his transfer to Scheveningen. On 5th May we used Trumpet to
open up a second radio link with London and passed a signal proposing a
new dropping area for this group which we had found a few kilometres
north of Holten. The Line of communication developed smoothly, and
evidently gave London no grounds for suspicion, for the dropping area
was approved shortly afterward, and we accepted the first drop there
about a fortnight later.

A third radio link with London was established in the following manner.
The signal plan for Turnip belonging to the dead operator Maartens had
been found on the person of the arrested agent Andringa. We signaled to
London via Trumpet that Andringa had discovered a reliable operator who
would be able to carry out Turnip's signal plan using Maarten's set, and
London gave him a trial transmission so as to test the efficiency of
this new recruit. The ORPO operator who took the test must have done it
excellently, for the next signal from `over there' told him that he was
approved. But we soon had new troubles, which worried me a lot.

About the middle of May Heinrichs reported anxiously to me that he and
his men suspected Lauwers of having transmitted several additional
letters at the end of his last routine period. It was in fact normal to
put a series of so called dummy letters at the end of signals, and his
`overseer' had consequently not immediately switched of the set. His
mistrust had, however, been aroused. Heinrichs could not himself be
present during every transmission by Lauwers or Jordaan, and he
requested urgently that the two operators should somehow be replaced by
his own men. I saw the overseer concerned at once. The man declared that
he did not know exactly what extra letters Lauwers had transmitted, but
that they had had no meaning. The man knew quite well that any other
answer could have brought him before a court for treasonable negligence,
but since nothing could be proved one way or the other we had to await
London's reactions.

I brought in Huntemann to try and find out what had actually happened,
as he was on very good terms with both the ORPO men and Lauwers. It
emerged simply that Lauwers had made some of the ORPO men much too
trusting, had `softened them up' as we put it. The routine periods had
become much too comfortable, and the good treatment I had ordered for
the operators, with coffee and cigarettes, had broadened into a
friendship which was proving highly dangerous. While awaiting London's
reaction, I did not tell Lauwers that our suspicions had been aroused.
Nevertheless, although there were no clear indications of treachery, we
soon afterward put an end to the operating of Lauwers and Jordaan by
once more using the trick of proposing a `reserve' operator-- which was
immediately approved.

We were now in a position to bring in an ORPO man onto the key in place
of either operator without London suspecting anything. The instruction
and employment of reserve operators drawn from the Dutch Underground
must have been quite understandable to them, as it was always possible
that a mishap might occur to the No. 1 operator at any time. Profiting
by these events, we did not in general use agent operators any longer.
After the arrest of agents sent across later on, their sets were
operated from the outset by the ORPO without any turn-over period. In
this procedure we ran the risk that the `handwriting' might have been
recorded in London (on a steel tape or gramophone) and that a comparison
might easily give rise to suspicion. By means of touch, speed of
operating and other individual characteristics of a transmission
technique an experienced ear can detect the difference between different
operators when on the key in exactly the same way as a musical ear can
detect difference between the renderings of different masters.

If the radio organization of MID-SOE had observed proper security
precautions we should never have been able to introduce our own ORPO
operators. But since our experience hitherto had not disclosed any
special degree of watchfulness on their part we took the risk. The
carelessness of the enemy is illustrated by the fact that more than
fourteen different radio links were established with London for longer
or shorter periods during the `Nordpol' operation, and these fourteen
were operated by six ORPO men!

===

In the course of the spring we had amassed a considerable store of
knowledge about the enemy's plans, his methods of operating and his
radio and ciphering systems. With the help of this experience we could
probably even have dealt with blind drops had any more taken place. If
the enemy had discovered the truth at this time, he would have had to
rebuild a difficult, costly organizational structure, employing entirely
new methods. Even making allowance for the fact that MID-SOE had not the
slightest suspicion of the true state of affairs, it is a fact that the
decision to drop `by arrangement' was the chief reason for the
catastrophe which followed. This arrangement, which was carried out
rigidly and without variation for over a year, was the really dramatic
feature of `Nordpol' amid the many other mistakes of omission and
commission made by our enemy.

One single control group, dropped blind and unknown to us in Holland,
with the sole duty of watching drops which had been arranged, could have
punctured in an instant the whole gigantic bubble of Operation
`Nordpol'. This unpleasant possibility was always before our eyes
during the long months of the play-back, and it kept us from getting too
sure of ourselves. We could never forget that each incoming or outgoing
radio signal might be the last of the operation.

The decision of MID-SOE was confirmed when the period form 28th May to
29th June brought three dropping operations, for which the `reliable'
groups Ebenezer and Trumpet had to provide the reception parties. The
operations were:

Operation Beetroot (via Ebenezer). Agents Parlevliet and van Steen
dropped near Steenwijk. Duties-- to instruct in the Eureka apparatus,
guiding beacons for aircraft. Radio communications in accordance with
Plan Swede.

Operation Parsnip (via Trumpet). Agents Rietschoten and Buizer dropped
near Holten on 22nd June. Duties-- organization of armed resistance in
Holland. Radio in accordance with Plan Marrow.

The duties prescribed for parties Beetroot and Marrow were of such
importance subsequently that I will discuss them in detail. The beetroot
party was welcomed on its arrival by Underground representatives who
were in fact Dutch police working for the SIPO. The arrests were made
after dawn, by which time the reception party had had time to find out
what the duties of the group were to be. Actually this plan broke down
in the case of Beetroot, but was highly successful in all the remaining
cases. On subsequent occasions we often discovered important details
from the enemy's side, particularly about their secret operational
intentions. For example, a single operation including the numbers under
instruction, their nationality, the teaching staff, standards of
ability, etc. Later on our knowledge extended into an accurate picture
of the inner circle of leading personalities `over there'.

===

Group Parsnip, which had been dropped on 22nd June near Holten, had  a
normal assignment, namely, the organization of a sabotage group in
Overijssel. Parsnip was consequently played back normally by the
customary process of opening up communication, agreeing on dropping
points and accepting drops. It was noteworthy that the operator Buizer
was, on London's orders, also supposed to transmit for Potato (De Haas),
Potato having previously worked through Ebenezer. Ebenezer's burden had
been lightened in this way because London considered it to be the most
reliable of its links and intended soon to use it for an important
special task-- the blowing up of the aerial system of the Kootwijk radio
transmitter.

At the beginning of July London told Ebenezer to make a reconnaissance
to see whether the aerial system could be blown up by demolition
commando under Taconis. In a series of signals exact details were given
of the method by which the whole system could be destroyed by means of
small charges placed at special points along the mast anchors. I
accordingly sent out a reconnaissance party of our people under Willy,
who were to conduct themselves exactly as if they were members of the
Underground, to find out in what way it would be possible, by day or
night, to approach the aerial system, and how the operation could then
be carried out. The precise state of affairs as reported by Willy was
then signaled to London. We reported a rather small guard, and an
inadequate watch over the surrounding area. The demolition of the
anchors would not present much difficulty. London signaled back that
Taconis must make his preparations in such away that the demolition
could be carried out on the night following the receipt of the
prearranged signal.

Toward the end of July we reported that Taconis and his men were ready,
and were told by London to stand by, but on no account to start anything
before receiving the signal. By the time this signal came I had already
thought out reasons for `failure'.

Two days later Ebenezer passed the following message to London:
``Kootwijk attempt a failure. Some of our men ran into a minefield near
the anchors. Explosions followed, then an engagement with the guards.
Five men missing. Taconis and remainder safe, including two wounded.''
And the next day: ``Two of the five missing men returned. Three others
were killed in action. Enemy has strengthened guard on Kootwijk and
other stations. Have broken off all contact. No signs yet that enemy is
on our track.'' London signaled back somewhat as follows: ``Much regret
your failure and losses. Method of defense is new and was not
foreseeable. Cease all activity for the present. Greatest watchfulness
necessary for some time. Report anything unusual.''

A fortnight later London sent Ebenezer a congratulatory message for the
Kootwijk party, adding that Taconis would receive a British decoration
for his leadership. The medal would be presented to him at the earliest
opportunity.

The attack planned on the Kootwijk transmitter was clearly aimed at the
destruction of the radio link by which the German Admirality
communicated with U Boats on the Atlantic. When some days later the
English made their landing attempt on the French coast near Dieppe we
saw another reason why Kootwijk had been intended to be destroyed.
Somewhat late in the day, the german Admirality hastened to carry into
actuality the form of defense for the aerial system which we had
conjured up in our imagination.

By arrangement with IC of the Wehrmacht staff, Rittmeister Jansen, I had
a reference to the Kootwijk affair published in the Dutch press. The
article referred to criminal elements who had attempted to blow up a
wireless station in Holland. The attempt had been a failure, and
captured sabotage material had pointed to enemy assistance. The law-
abiding population was warned once again against committing or
supporting such acts. I hoped that my opponents in London would receive
this report by way of neutral countries.

A description of OPeration Marrow which follows covers the decisive
phase of `Nordpol' from June, 1942 until the spring of 1943.

We knew from the first conversations on the night of the drop what the
tasks were which had been given in London to the leader of Marrow,
Jambroes, and his operator Bukkens, in broad outline. The plans of MID-
SOE, revealed by interrogation, were on a big scale which underestimated
the Abwehr potential on the German side. Typical of this was the
misunderstanding of the true position in Holland concerning the morale
of the population. There is no doubt that the willingness of the mass of
the people to participate directly or indirectly in preparations for
underground warfare did not correspond with London's expectations. It
was not until one to two years later that morale grew gradually more
favorable toward such plans as a result of the military defeats of the
Third Reich, the growing Allied superiority and repressive German
actions both against the population and against the economy of the
western occupied areas.

By the terms of Plan Marrow, Jambroes, who was a Dutch Reserve officer,
was to establish contact with the leader of the organization OD
(Ordedienst) and get them to provide men to carry out the plans of MID-
SOE. Sixteen groups, each of a hundred men, were to be organized all
over the country as armed sabotage and resistance nuclei. Two agents
from London, a group-leader-cum-instructor and a radio operator, were to
take over the leadership, organization, training and arming of these
groups. No doubt this plan looked fine from an armchair in London. But
its fulfillment was postponed indefinitely by the fact that Jambroes
never met the leaders of the OD.

It soon became clear to us that we could not play back Jambroes' task,
because as we did know who were the leaders of the OD we would not be
able to tell London what Jambroes had discussed with them-- when
Jambroes himself was all the time under arrest. So we had to put it to
London that the task originally assigned to Jambroes was impracticable,
and take action in accordance with what we imagined to be the true state
of affairs. We now proceeded to overwhelm London with a flood of reports
about signs of demoralization among the leaders of the OD. The
Leadership, we said, was so penetrated by German informers that direct
contact with its members as ordered by London would certainly attract
the attention of Germans.  When the replies from London began to show
signs of uncertainty and instructed Jambroes to be careful, we started a
new line. This proposed that Jambroes should make contact with
individual and reliable leaders from OD area groups, so as to form the
sixteen groups planned by consultation with the middle and lower OD
levels. Our proposal met with some objections, but was finally
recognized in a practical manner by the increasing of the support
through agents and material given to Group Marrow and its supposed
component organizations.

The build-up of the Marrow organization began in August, 1942. Naturally
at no time were links established with OD groups or with their leaders.
On the contrary, we assured London repeatedly that we were making use of
more reliable and security-minded individuals. The development of the
sixteen Marrow groups had soon made such apparent progress that between
the end of September and November London sent across seventeen agents
through our hands in Holland, most of whom were destined for Marrow
groups. Five were operators with independent radio links. We had these
five lines in working order by the end of November, operating in
accordance with Plans Chive, Broccoli, Cucumber, Tomato, and Celery.
Each of these five groups set to work and were soon able to give
dropping points to London, which were approved and supplied continuously
with materials. At the beginning of December we signaled a progress
report of the existing state of the Marrow groups to London. According
to this, about fifteen hundred men were under training, attached to
eight Marrow groups. In practice, these training detachments would have
urgent need of such articles as clothing, underwear, footwear, bicycle
tires, tobacco and tea. We accordingly asked for a supply of all these
articles, and in the middle of December we received a consignment in
thirty-two containers totaling some five thousand kilos, dropped in four
different areas in the course of one night.

Our information indicated that a new party of agents had completed their
training at the secret schools in England about the middle of January,
in preparation for action in Holland. From 18th January to 21st April
1943 seventeen more agents were dropped by MID-SOE and met by our
reception parties. This time again the majority were group leaders and
instructors for Marrow and other sabotage groups. One party of two men
had intelligence tasks. Another two-man party was given the task of
establishing a courier line from Holland via Brussels and Paris to
Spain, and a single woman agent who arrived had been given intelligence
duties. The newcomers included seven operators with independent radio
links.

The agents supplied in the spring of 1943 fulfilled the requirements of
personnel for the MID-SOE groups which had been planned in Holland. With
my few assistants, I was faced with the problem of keeping London's
operational maps supplied with information about the multifarious
activities of nearly fifty agents, and it seemed impossible that we
could keep this up for long. To meet our difficulties an attempt had to
be made to get London to agree to a reduction in the number of working
radio links which were now available. We accordingly proposed `for
reasons of greater security' to close down some of the Marrow
transmitters. These sets, we said, would form a reserve in case some of
the active transmitters and their operators should be knocked out by
German action. We subsequently arrived at the position where all the
Marrow sets only Marrow I to Marrow V remained in operation.

Although several times between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1943
we had reported one of our controlled transmitters as having been
knocked out by German action, we had been compelled at times to operate
as many as fourteen lines simultaneously. A reduction in radio traffic
was essential for the one reason alone that we had a maximum of six ORPO
radio operators at our disposal for handling the entire radio traffic
with London, and these men were being continually worked up to the very
limits of their capacity.

This account of how agents were dropped direct into our arms has not yet
described any efforts by MID-SOE to get knowledge of the true state of
affairs in Holland. Though there was no lack of trying, these attempts
never made allowance for the fact that a possibility did exist that the
entire communication network and all the agents sent in were in German
hands. The most noteworthy enemy attempt at control, which may perhaps
have been one of a number we did not recognize as such, occurred at the
time of Operation Parsley on 21st September 1942. There was little doubt
that the agent who was dropped, a certain Jongelie, cover-name `Arie',
had a control task. Shortly after his arrest Jongelie declared that in
order to confirm his safe arrival he must at once signal to London:
``The express left on time.'' By saying this he put his SIPO
interrogators in a quandary, a situation which they were meeting for the
first time.

I had spent the night of the Parsley operation in the dropping area,
which lay a few kilometres east of Assen, and had returned to The Hague
at about 0700. At nine the telephone bell roused me from my slumbers,
and the head interrogator of Schreieder's section IVE informed me of
what Jongelie had just said. He added that this message would apparently
have to be dispatched at the first routine period at 1100.

Half an hour later I was sitting opposite Jongelie in the Binnenhof. He
was a man of about forty, with a broad, leathery face, who for a long
time had been chief operator for the Dutch naval headquarters in
Batavia. After a short conversation it was quite clear that Jongelie had
developed some Asiatic cunning during his long period of service in
Indonesia. With an unnaturally immobile face, he answered my pressing
questions repeatedly with the statement that he must pass the message
``The express left on time'' at 1100 or London would realize that he was
in German hands. Finally I pretended to be convinced. Seemingly deep in
thought, I said that we would pass his message at 1100-- and then, as I
suddenly raised my eyes, a gleam of triumph appeared in his. So this was
treachery! At 1100 we passed the following message: ``Accident has
occurred in Operation Parsley. Arie landed heavily and is unconscious.
He is safe and in good hands. Doctor diagnoses severe concussion.
Further report will be made. All material safe.'' Three days later we
signaled: ``Arie regained consciousness for short period yesterday.
Doctor hopes for an improvement.'' And the next day the message ran:
``Arie died suddenly yesterday without regaining consciousness. We will
bury him on the moor. We hope to give him a worthy memorial after
victory is won.''

I have related this case in detail as an example of how competent tough
agents, who had been appropriately prepared in London, could easily have
forced us into the position where a single treacherous report would have
blown the gaff. All we could do in such cases was to pretend that the
man was dead or that he had been arrested by the Germans. A series of
such `accidents' would probably always have been less dangerous than the
possibility of treachery. Shortly after the Arie incident London began
to press us to send Jambroes, the head of the Marrow groups, back to
London for consultation, Jambroes having to name a deputy to act for him
in his absence.  The request accorded with the man's earlier statements
that after three months of preparatory activity in Holland he would be
required back in England. A reference to the possibilities of Jambroes'
journey was now never absent from our interchange of signals. At first
we described him as indispensable due to unforeseen difficulties in the
building up of the sixteen groups, and in due course we found new
excuses, in which the difficult and lengthy journey by the insecure
courier route into Spain played the principal part.


Nineteen forty-two went by in this way. At the beginning of 1943 the
requests from London for a personal report became more urgent and were
now broadened to include representatives from other groups. Innumerable
signals passed. London began to demand information about areas in
Holland where land or sea planes could be sent to pick up couriers or
agents. We were unable to find suitable areas, or, alternatively, those
which we did find and reported did not suit the gentlemen `over there'--
or else we would suddenly declare them `unsafe,' whenever the
organization of a special flight seemed imminent.

On various occasions we reported a number of agents as having departed
for France, who were expected every month to arrive, but naturally never
did so. Finally we took the only course still open to us and reported
Jamboes as missing [...] informing London that our investigations showed
that he could not be traced subsequent to a German police raid in
Rotterdam. [...]

On 18th January 1943 Group Golf was dropped into Holland. Golf's duties
were to prepare secure courier routes through Belgium and France to
Spain and Switzerland. The group was well supplied with blanks for
Dutch, Belgian, and French identity cards with stamps and dies for the
forging of German passes of all kinds, and with francs and pesetas. We
let about six weeks pass before Golf signaled to London that a reliable
and secure route had been established as far as Paris. The courier for
the Golf groups would be an experienced man with cover name `Arnaud.' In
actual fact Arnaud was none other than my Unteroffizier Arno, who had
effected an excellent penetration of the enemy courier routes by posing
as a refugee Frenchman who made his living by smuggling jewels. We
proposed to London that we should dispatch to Spain via the Arnaud route
two English flying officers who were living underground in Holland in
order to test the reliability of this `escape line.' Our proposal was
approved, and London confirmed three weeks later that the men had
arrived safely in Spain.

Through this exploit, the Golf group and Arnaud acquired much credit in
London, and in the spring and summer of 1943 London gave us details of
three active stations of the British Secret Service in Paris which were
working on escape routes. These were run partly by French and partly by
English personnel and had their own radio links with London. Obviously
we did not permit the German counterespionage in Paris to take action
against these stations, once more adhering to the principle that
intelligence is more valuable than elimination. My section under Major
Wieskotter now had a clear view of the inner working of these important
escape lines, made possible by the well-sponsored arrival of Arnaud in
the organization by reason of a signaled recommendation by London to the
stations concerned.

The responsibility for innumerable captures of couriers and espionage
material, of incoming and outgoing agents, and of espionage and radio
centers in Holland and Belgium during 1943, inexplicable to the enemy
Secret Services, must be laid at the door of MID-SOE's confidence in the
Golf radio link, which had been in our hands since the day of its
arrival in Holland. In actual fact Golf rendered certain services to the
enemy in order to increase this confidence.

We had proved once again the truth of the old saying: `give and it shall
be given unto you.' Numbers of Allied flying personnel who had been shot
down and had gone underground in Holland and Belgium had reached Spain
after an adventurous journey without ever knowing, perhaps until the
present day, that they had all the time been under the wing of the
German counterespionage.

===

On 31st August, Queen's Day in Holland, two `Nordpol' agents, Ubbinnk
and Dourlein, broke out of the prison in Haaren and disappeared. I had a
short report to this effect on the morning of 1st September from
Schreieder's office. Soon afterward Schreieder himself rang up in
considerable agitation to give me a seemingly endless description of the
measures which he had taken for their recapture. It was clear to me
that, through this incident, the bottom had been knocked out of the
whole `Nordpol' operation. Even if the fugitives did not succeed in
reaching Spain, Switzerland or even England itself, they were at large--
though perhaps only temporarily-- and would certainly somehow record
their experiences since their departure from England and get this report
by some means or other back across the Channel.

===

During the first ten days of December London's signals became so dull
and colorless compared with their usual quality that it did not need
all our knowledge to enable us to guess that the enemy was trying to
deceive us in his turn. Hardly any doubt remained that Ubbink and
Dourlein had reached their objective. Nevertheless, we made no move, and
gave not the slightest indication that we too realized that the great
bubble of the agent network and radio links in Holland had finally been
pricked.

In March, 1944, I proposed to Berlin that we should put an end to the
hollow mockery of the `Nordpol' radio links by means of a final
message. I was immediately told to submit a draft for approval to Abwehr
Berlin, which must express confidence in victory. Huntemann and I set
ourselves to compose a message which should fulfill not only Berlin's
requirements but also our reflection on the two years' hoax which we had
carried out so successfully.  This message, the first to be transmitted
quite openly in plain language, must not in any way fall short of the
standard of the thousand-odd cipher signals which had been previously
dispatched. We sat at my desk and exchanged our first attempts at a
suitable text in order to discover something worthy of this unique
occasion. Writing rather as if we were playing `consequences', each of
us composing a few sentences in turn, we finally agreed on the
following:

``To Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co., Successors Ltd., London. We
understand that you have been endeavoring for some time to do business
in Holland without our assistance. We regret this the more since we have
acted for so long as your sole representatives in this country, to our
mutual satisfaction. Nevertheless we can assure you that, should you be
thinking of paying us a visit on the Continent on any extensive scale,
we shall give your emissaries the same attention as we have hitherto,
and a similarly warm welcome. Hoping to see you.''

The names given were those of the men whom we knew to be at the head of
the Netherlands section of SOE. We signaled this draft to Berlin for
their approval. They were evidently occupied with more important
matters, however, and we had to wait a fortnight until, after one or two
reminders, we received permission to transmit the message without
amendment.

I passed the plain language text to the FuB station on 31st March, with
instructions to pass it to England over all the lines controlled by us,
which at that time numbered ten, the next day. It had occurred to me
that 1st April might be particularly apposite.

The following afternoon the FuB station reported that London had
accepted the message on four lines, but had not answered calls on the
other six. [...]

Operation `Nordpol' was over.

The attempt of the Allied Secret Services to gain a foothold in Holland
had been delayed by two years. The establishment of armed sabotage and
terror organizations, which might have disorganized the rear areas of
the Atlantic Wall and crippled our defenses at the critical moment of
invasion, had been prevented. The penetration of the Underground
movement had led to the liquidation of widely spread and boldly directed
enemy espionage services. The complete deception of the enemy about the
real state of affairs in Holland would have subjected him to the danger
of a heavy defeat had he attempted to attack during 1942 or 1943. The
information which we had gained about the activities and intentions of
the enemy Secret Services had contributed directly to the countering of
corresponding plans in other countries.

Operation `Nordpol' was no more than a drop in the ocean of blood and
tears, of the suffering and destruction of the Second World War. It
remains nonetheless a noteworthy page in the chequered and adventurous
story of Secret Service, a story which is as old as humanity and as war
itself.